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Wars are not won on battlefields alone. Logistics, strategy, resources, force strength, and
technology have all played critical roles in determining outcomes in major conflicts throughout
history. Yet, there are still two related factors that have much to say about the outcome of major
conflicts: propaganda efforts to sell the war effort to the nation states that are a part of the conflict
and its impact on public opinion around the participation of those nation states among its citizenry.
History offers us some prominent examples that reinforce this point, and they consistently revolve
around the ability of parties involved in the conflict to effectively leverage contemporary
communication outlets to effective ends in order to shape and manage public opinion.
Walter Lippmann’s iconic Public Opinion (1922) provides his perspective as a newsman and as a
member of Woodrow Wilson’s collection of journalists, advertisers, early public relations
practitioners, and education philosophers who worked from the United States’ involvement in
World War I in April of 1917 through the effort to promote the Treaty of Versailles and the League
of Nations. He warns of the potential for manipulation of information to cultivate and maintain
support for military and political action, and the need for objectivity in journalism and a refined
study of public opinion to counter its effects.
The father of modern public relations, Edward Bernays, offered two texts on the subject of
propaganda and its effectiveness in shaping public opinion on behalf of organizations. In
Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), Bernays establishes his understanding of public relations
counsel, public opinion, its formation, how one shapes it, and its necessity for achieving public
action. In Propaganda (1928), Bernays offers some perspective on the practice, its role in public
relations, and its value to many facets of society. Many found Bernays to offer a manipulative
perspective on the discipline, and a reading of both texts leaves this author sympathetic to their
perspective. Bernays opens Propaganda with the following Machiavellian perspective in reference
to democracy in propaganda:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen
mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of
our country. ...We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in
which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate
in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society. ...In almost
every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social
conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of
persons...who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they
who pull the wires which control the public mind. Bernays, 1928, p. 1.
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While much of both texts give a reader a window into the modern intellectual evolution of
the practice of public relations, it is segments like this that left Bernays with a dubious
reputation among prominent members of society, and further damaged the initial reputation
around the professional practice of public relations. While it is clear that the work of the Creel
Committee and its membership helped solidify and advance the practice of public relations past
its early publicist origins into matters of shaping public opinion and behavior to establishing and
managing relationships, what is not clear is how early we see the elements of modern best practices
in public relations practice in play. The purpose of this study is to examine the execution of the
Four Minute Men Speech campaign, using the ROPES PR model (Kelly, 1998) to determine the
overall adherence of the campaign to modern best practices. In the examination of the Four Minute
Men, the author will draw parallels to specific strategies and tactics, content choices, and selection
of speakers to illustrate how much of the work of the CPI set early precedents for modern public
relations practice. Further, the paper will demonstrate how the actions of the Creel Committee
established a baseline for scholarship that developed theories of practice that would achieve
effective, ethical approaches to public relations practice.

Context
American War, Public Opinion, and Communication
In the case of American conflicts throughout its first 242 years, we see a country that wins or loses
its battles through effective management of the public mindset, often through the communication
modes of the day. During the American Revolution, the colonists made the most of the early postal
service and the printing press to shape and manage public opinion during a challenging conflict
with a British force superior in size and early strategy, providing enough public support to enable
colonists to outlast Britain’s patience and budget to earn independence. The American Civil War
illustrated the power of the telegraph and modern photography to permit war correspondents to
bring the horrors of the battlefield into the American home (Lewinski, 1980). The SpanishAmerican War was the product of Yellow Journalism’s sensational efforts to cultivate support
among the American citizenry to support a conflict between the nations, exemplified by William
Randolph Hearst’s infamous remarks about providing war if his staff provided the pictures
(Wilkerson, 1967). Newsreels first utilized during the Great War (Creel, 1920), were perfected
during World War II as a means of bringing news around the world and about conflict home.
Radio, still in its adolescence, took on an essential role for political leaders and broadcast
correspondents like Edward R. Murrow in bringing news from the front home, and in shaping the
public’s perspective on the actions of Axis powers, as well as in sharing the struggles and triumphs
of Allied forces (Cozma, 2010). Propaganda in film also found its stride during the second world,
as Leni Reifenstahl and Frank Capra both elevated the art form to shape public opinion and
mobilize support for their respective countries, Germany and the United States (Kelman, 1973;
Xifra & Girona, 2012). The Vietnam War brought network news to the forefront as correspondents
brought the quagmire into American homes and elevated the reputation of CBS anchorman Walter
Cronkite to be able to decry the efforts of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, ultimately
undermining the war efforts (Gitlin, 1980).
In modern conflicts, the Department of Defense has effectively managed modern communication
to create the public images that generate support for military efforts, with a helping hand from
lessons learned from cable television. Cable News Network’s (CNN’s) Bernard Shaw, John
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Holliman, and Peter Arnett made the decision to stay in Baghdad the night of January 16,
1991 and captured U.S. airstrike coverage on the scene, in spite of every other news
organization’s decision to leave under the threat of the attack issued from the U.S. embassy.
The coverage earned critical acclaim for then upstart CNN, as well as for 24-hour cable news,
while also sanitizing modern warfare for the American public, often drawing comparisons to
watching video games.
Always apt to learn from innovation in communication, on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the Pentagon announced it would embed journalists with military units to provide access to the
invasion. What was not a part of the dialog was the strategic placement of journalists away from
the most severe aspects of the action in order to control the narrative of the conflict. Journalists
themselves came away with the impression that they did well, but acknowledged they had a much
narrower view of the conflict than if they had a wider access to the invasion (Fahmy & Johnson,
2005).
The impact of mass communication to shape public opinion and the outcome of warfare in
American history is clear. It is unsurprising then that Woodrow Wilson would seek to leverage
mass communication strategically to shape public opinion and align public thinking with the
shifting perspective of the United States’ involvement in World War I. This becomes essential
when considering where public opinion was on the War, and how Wilson had positioned himself
during his first term in office and successfully earned re-election.
“He Kept Us Out of War”
In the summer of 1914, the United States had no interest in the conflict brewing across Europe.
Aside from the geographic barrier of the Atlantic, the United States held none of the binding
treaties that drove 11 nations into the fight by September of 1914, and would have maintained that
distance if the country had been left to do so (Axelrod, 2009). Over the first two years of war,
submarine attacks on American shipping and civilian vessels (most notably the deaths of 128
Americans on the British Lusitania), pleas from allied nations, and rumors of German spies and
plots to attack the United States created a growing pressure to join the fight and support the allied
effort. This was balanced against a pacifist movement from Jane Addams and the American Union
Against Militarism (Badertscher, 2014), the National Women’s Party, along with a consistent
public outcry from the then popular Socialist Party of America’s Eugene V. Debs, as well as
progressive Republicans in Congress, among them Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follete. This was
reinforced by general anti-war sentiments from German-Americans, Jewish-Americans, IrishAmericans, Wilson’s own base of southern whites, who feared unrest among immigrants in border
states like Missouri, and prominent American industrialist Henry Ford. Wilson even saw pressure
and criticism from his own party as his Secretary of State and fellow progressive Democrat
William Jennings Bryant stood in opposition to war and resigned in protest over Wilson’s use of
a warning against the German government if they persisted in submarine warfare against American
civilian vessels following the attack on the HMS Lusitania (May, 1966). These competing
pressures were set against the backdrop of Wilson’s campaign for re-election.
In 1916, Wilson faced a challenge from popular Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
who ran on the Republican ticket with heavy support from former President Theodore Roosevelt
(Pietrusza, 2018). The Democrats built their campaign around the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of
War," saying a Republican victory would mean war with both Mexico and Germany. Wilson's
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position was probably critical in winning the Western states (Cooper, 2009). Charles Evans
Hughes insisted on downplaying the war issue, while advocating a program of greater
mobilization and preparedness. Wilson had successfully pressured the Germans to suspend
unrestricted submarine warfare, making it difficult for Hughes to attack Wilson's peace platform.
Hughes, instead, criticized Wilson's military interventions in Mexico, where the U.S. was
supporting various factions in the Mexican civil war, and his progressive positions on labor. His
criticisms gained little traction, however, especially among factory workers who supported such
laws. Hughes was helped by the vigorous support of popular former President Theodore Roosevelt,
and by the fact that the Republicans were still the nation's majority party at the time.
Wilson’s campaign advanced the idea that entrance in the war created the potential for a conflict
on two fronts with Mexico’s relationship with Germany still in question, as well as the native
presence of immigrants from both sides of the conflict living throughout the continental United
States. These concerns in no small part led much of the electorate in the western United States to
support Wilson, bringing the previously Republican stronghold of California into question.
Hughes made a key mistake in California. Just before the election, Hughes made a campaign swing
through the state, but he never met with the powerful Republican Governor Hiram Johnson to seek
his support. Johnson, in turn, never gave Hughes his full support. Wilson carried California by
3,420 votes (0.3%) and with it the presidency. With his re-election campaign won, Wilson would
now have to put his focus back on America’s position on World War I.
A White Hot Mass of Support
A confluence of factors finally led Wilson to determine it was necessary to enter the war in support
of the allies. Over the course of the first two years of war, America’s neutrality was grounded in
staying off the battlefields, but maintaining open business practices with nations willing to pay for
goods and resources. Due to the heavy blockades, which limited commerce with the central
powers, this led to a heavy bias in commerce with Great Britain and France.
In 1917, Germany decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare against any vessel
approaching British waters in an attempt to starve Britain into surrender. Their desperation to gain
a strategic advantage came with the knowledge that it would almost certainly bring the United
States into the war. Germany also worked through diplomatic backchannels to bring Mexico and
Japan into the fight. Germany offered to help Mexico regain territories lost in the Mexican–
American War in an encoded telegram known as the Zimmermann Telegram, which was
intercepted by British Intelligence. British intelligence, showing strategic prudence, held this
intelligence for the right time to get the desired response from Wilson. Publication of the telegram
outraged Americans just as German U-boats started sinking American merchant ships in the North
Atlantic. Wilson then asked Congress for "a war to end all wars" that would "make the world safe
for democracy,” and Congress voted to declare war on Germany on April 6, 1917 (Link, 1972).
While it was clear Wilson’s decision to take the United States into war came with a split public
perspective on the decision, there were indicators among members of the public that there was
sound support behind the decision. In 1914, there was a healthy base of support for the war among
Americans who sympathized with France, Great Britain, and Belgium. Progressive politics had
also brought much of its support base to the idea of being “citizens of the world.” Civic
organizations had cropped up all over the United States with the expressed mission to support the
war effort.
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The Committee for Relief in Belgium negotiated relief efforts for civilians on both sides of
the fighting in Belgium. The committee also sowed the seeds for national concern by
advancing the principle of America generosity. African-Americans open outrage with the
central powers’ actions in the Congo prompted them to push to volunteer in opposition to the
Germans and Austrian-Hungarian governments. The Jewish community in the United States
worked actively with other Jewish relief groups around the world to support those in the faith in
peril in the region (Axelrod, 2009). In short, there were pockets of support to be leveraged in the
same way Wilson leveraged pacifists to win election in November of 1916 as he came to address
foreign policy in April of 1917.
Former political opponents became a resource as focus turned from neutrality to mobilization.
Teddy Roosevelt’s preparedness movement opened the door for Wilson to more easily bring in
early volunteers prior to pushes for the draft. When it was clear war was imminent, and Wilson
needed to have a moral argument for shifting his position, he leveraged the Progressive drive for
preparedness and these pockets of support to achieve the change in opinion he sought. His
argument: Democracy needed to be the model for benevolent world citizenship to avoid future
wars, and America needed to drive this change through action to preserve freedom for the world
(Axelrod, 2009).
Popular forms of modern mass communication had already begun influencing public opinion in
advance of the turn to the CPI to drive the action, demonstrating the power of mass communication
in contributing to shaping public opinion. Filmmakers had begun telling the story of the German
assault on Belgium. Editorials had called for American support. Artists and political cartoonists
had driven the dialog around American support for the war since 1914. Finally, sheet music and
early recordings from Tin Pan Alley had been a forum for dialog from both camps on matters of
American involvement and neutrality, respectively (Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920).
Knowing that he had made the request and gathered solid support for entry into war, Wilson was
keenly aware that he would have to change public perceptions of the war and the United States’
participation in it. Given the split in American public opinion, Wilson understood that he needed
to get a unified public position that would support his push into the war effort. To achieve this, he
reached out to his supporter, political operative, and former journalist George Creel. Wilson issued
Executive Order 2594 mobilizing the Committee of Public Information (also known as the Creel
Committee) on April 13, 1917. Creel was a true believer in Wilson’s doctrine, and had been so
since meeting him as a Governor in New Jersey. In his conversations with Wilson, Creel stated
that they needed to achieve a monolithic, “white hot mass of support” (Axelrod, 2009; Creel,
1920).
The committee consisted of George Creel (chairman) and as ex officio members the Secretaries of
State (Robert Lansing), War (Newton D. Baker), and the Navy (Josephus Daniels). The CPI was
the first state bureau covering propaganda in the history of the United States. Creel urged Wilson
to create a government agency to coordinate "not propaganda as the Germans defined it, but
propaganda in the true sense of the word, meaning the 'propagation of faith.'" He was a journalist
with years of experience on the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News before accepting
Wilson's appointment to the CPI. He had a contentious relationship with Secretary Lansing
(Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920).
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Wilson established the first modern propaganda office (Creel, 1920). Creel set out to
systematically reach every person in the United States multiple times with patriotic
information about how the individual could contribute to the war effort. The Committee also
worked with the post office to censor seditious counter-propaganda. Creel set up divisions in his
new agency to produce and distribute innumerable copies of pamphlets, newspaper releases,
magazine advertisements, films, school campaigns, and the speeches of the Four Minute Men. CPI
created colorful posters that appeared in every store window, catching the attention of the
passersby for a few seconds (Adams, 1999). Historians were assigned to write pamphlets and indepth histories of the causes of the European war (Blakey, 1970; Committee on Public
Information, 1920).
In spite of the tensions, a rapid growth in the CPI illustrated the priority on influencing American
public opinion, and Creel’s ability to recruit and attract talent to the effort. From the original
handful of cabinet members and Creel, the CPI grew to a staffing population of over 100,000
members. The large membership included a diverse population of artists, journalists, advertising
executives, political scientists, the famous educational philosopher John Dewey, and some of the
early forefathers of modern public relations, including Carl Byoir and Edward Bernays (Axelrod,
1920; Creel, 1920). In putting the committee together, Creel married the most innovative
journalists, public relations practitioners, advertising professionals, and other key social scientists
to achieve the aim of the organization. In the process, they set a foundation for modern practices
in public communication and public relations.
The CPI used material based on fact, but spun it to present an upbeat picture of the American war
effort. Creel claimed that the CPI routinely denied false or undocumented atrocity reports, fighting
the crude propaganda efforts of "patriotic organizations" like the National Security League and the
American Defense Society that preferred "general thundering" and wanted the CPI to "preach a
gospel of hate” (Committee on Public Information, 1920).
The CPI staged events designed for many different ethnic groups, in their languages. For instance,
Irish-American tenor John McCormack sang at Mount Vernon before an audience representing
Irish-American organizations (Fleming, 2003). The Committee also targeted the American worker
and, endorsed by Samuel Gompers, filled factories and offices with posters designed to promote
the critical role of American labor in the success of the war effort (Axelrod, 2009; Fleming, 2003).
The CPI's activities were so thorough that historians later stated, using the example of a typical
midwestern American farm family, that every item of war news they saw—in the country weekly,
in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely
officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens
were getting at the same moment. Every war story had been censored somewhere along the line—
at the source, in transit, or in the newspaper offices in accordance with ‘voluntary’ rules established
by the CPI.
The CPI could not escape charges of censorship and presenting a false presentation of the war
effort. The most common example was the critique of the organization’s perceived role in
censorship. While it is well established that they influenced news coverage through promoting
self-censorship with news organizations as a function or patriotism, and by issuing press releases
that presented Wilson’s perspective on the war (Axelrod, 2009), Creel took offense that his agency
was responsible for censorship. Creel said of the critique in his memoir:
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In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or
repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the positive. At no point did it
seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of speech and
press. In all things, from first to last, without halt or change, it was a plain publicity
proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventures in
advertising.... We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to
be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative
throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was
needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of the facts. Creel, 1920; emphasis
added.

It was clear the public criticism was taking its toll on the efforts of the CPI. By 1917, the term
propaganda had already become toxic enough that Creel himself worked actively to distance CPI
work from the characterization. With a background on the development of the broader set of tools
and practitioners employed to re-shape public opinion around the Great War, the attention now
shifts to the strategy that is the focus of this study, the Four Minute Men Campaign.
Speaking Tours For the People, Of the People
The Four Minute Men were a group of volunteers authorized by United States President Woodrow
Wilson, to give four-minute speeches on topics given to them by The Committee on Public
Information (CPI). In 1917-1918, around 7,555,190 speeches were given in 5,200 communities
(Creel, 1920). The effort began when William McCormick Blair approached Creel with an idea
about how to make one more point of contact with American citizens to generate support for the
war effort. Blair recognized that there was an opening during the four minutes between reels
changing in movie theaters across the country, where films and news reels in support of the war
were already playing. In time, the four-minute speeches allowed for presentation at town meetings,
restaurants, and other places that had an audience. This is an instance of "viral marketing" before
its time (Mastrangelo, 2009).
For his idea, Blair was appointed as director of the Four Minute Men by the CPI. Blair appointed
state chairmen of the Four Minute Men, who then would appoint a city or community chairman.
Each of these appointments needed to be approved in Washington. The local chairman would then
appoint a number of speakers to cover the theaters in the city or community for which he was
responsible (Creel, 1920).
With many millions of German-Americans in the United States, as well as Irish-Americans and
Scandinavian-Americans and poor rural Southerners, with strong isolationist feelings, there was a
strong need for a propaganda campaign to stir support for the war. This effort had many unique
challenges to meet to address the existing political climate. Wilson needed to speak directly to the
fragmented and spread-out audience in the United States. He had to address the country's selfperception to generate support for the war. The Four Minute Men provided an answer to these
challenges (Mastrangelo, 2009).
In addition, the Four Minute Men urged citizens to purchase Liberty Bonds and Thrift Stamps.
The CPI trained thousands of volunteer speakers to make patriotic appeals during the four-minute
breaks needed to change reels. They also spoke at churches, lodges, fraternal organizations, labor
unions, and even logging camps. Speeches were mostly in English, but ethnic groups were reached
in their own languages. Creel boasted that in 18 months his 75,000 volunteers delivered over 7.5
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million four-minute orations to over 300 million listeners, in a nation of 103 million people
(Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920). The work of the Four Minute Men continued beyond the
Armistice, as the speeches turned towards generating support for the Treaty of Versailles at
the community level in an effort to gain support for Congressional endorsement (Axelrod, 2009).
The Four Minute Men idea became a useful tool in the propaganda campaign because it
addressed a specific rhetorical situation. One of the challenges of the effort was the fragmented
audience of the United States. Many different heritages were represented in the countrty, and the
president needed their support for the war. To address each group’s specific needs, the Director
of the Four Minute Men, William McCormick Blair, delegated the duty of speaking to local men.
Well-known and respected community figures often volunteered for the Four Minute Men
program. This gave the speeches a local voice. Further, the Four Minute Men brought in movie
celebrities of the day like Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, and Douglas Fairbanks. Even
Woodrow Wilson engaged in the campaign.
The Four Minute Men were also given general topics and talking points to follow and rotated
among theaters to help the speeches seem fresh, instead of generic propaganda speeches. They
were encouraged to improvise and be extemporaneous, within the bounds the strategic aims of the
campaign. These speeches usually celebrated Woodrow Wilson as a larger than life character and
the Germans as less-than-human huns. The speakers attended training sessions through local
universities, and were given pamphlets and speaking tips on a wide variety of topics, such as
buying Liberty Bonds, registering for the draft, rationing food, recruiting unskilled workers for
munitions jobs, and supporting Red Cross programs (Mastrangelo, 2009). It becomes clear to
modern practitioners on first blush that some essential elements of public relations work come
through in the discussion of Wilson’s management of public perception before and after the United
States entering the war, reflected in the operations of the CPI and the Four Minute Men. This raises
a key question: To what extent does the Four Minute Men campaign adhere to the steps of modern
public relations practice?
Learning the ROPES
Initially conceived of as a viable model for conducting public relations work focused on
fundraising and development, Kelly (1998) devised the ROPES model as a means of refining the
long-established RACE (Research, Action, Communication, Evaluation) model of public relations
campaigns. The ROPES model consists of the following steps: Research, Objectives,
Programming, Evaluation, and Stewardship. The following presents Kelly’s advice to the
practitioner.
Before beginning a campaign, Kelly urged practitioners to understand the background behind it.
The research stage of ROPES has three elements to help a practitioner do this. First, you identify
the opportunity or problem that forms the basis for your campaign. Then, you ensure that you have
a solid knowledge of the organization you represent, understanding its history, current position
and future objectives. Finally, you should research the company's audiences, taking time to
investigate past public relations initiatives and the way that external stakeholders, such as
customers, feel about the organization.
In the second stage of the ROPES formula, you set one or more clear goals, which you can assess
through establishing measurable objectives for your campaign based on the opportunity or problem
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identified in the research stage. Typically, objectives are outputs, outtakes or outcomes. For
example, an output objective might focus on achieving media coverage, an outtake on
changing audience awareness and an outcome on an action, such as an increase in sales or
web traffic. Your client may not be specific about what he wants from the campaign, but you
should be. Over time, ROPES scholarship has improved, and scholars have adopted a principle of
best practice from management literature to suggest public relations objectives should be specific,
measurable, actionable, realistic, and time-based, or follow the SMARTS model (Doran, 1981).
Once you understand where your campaign should go, you must plan how to get it there and launch
it. In the programming stage, you decide which public relations communication tools to use to
meet your objectives, taking into account the messages you need to convey, the audience you are
targeting and the media you need to use to reach this audience. During this stage, you also set your
budget. It is important that as you engage in programming and execution, you have chosen
strateg(ies) and tactics that align with your stated goals and objectives. Your preliminary research
should inform your goals, objectives, and strategic approaches.
Stewardship (Kelly, 2001) has become a trending practice for public relations professionals
because it allows them to establish and maintain relationship-building efforts with stakeholders
who should be included in everyday communication. Practicing relationship cultivation strategies
is important to solidify ongoing relationships with your organization’s publics in order to maintain
a strong and trusted brand. Since it is important for public relations practitioners to foster
relationships with clients, partners, journalists and key audiences, scholars posit four dimensions
of stewardship: reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and relationship nurturing.
Reciprocity. Recognizing stakeholders and demonstrating gratitude for their involvement
with the organization is always important. Treat stakeholders to dinner or send them a
company newsletter. Reciprocity will create the ultimate “win-win” situation for both
stakeholders and your company.
Responsibility. Being responsible means keeping promises to stakeholders while
achieving high standards of organizational management and decision making. In order to
ensure a trusted brand, company representatives need to make sure they meet client
deadlines and put client needs first – that way there is no discernible gap between promise
and delivery.
Reporting. Organizations should communicate internal developments to their publics
when they can. For instance, in a crisis communication, it is extremely important to report
to publics what is actually happening. A more in-depth explanation about the crisis and
how the organization will address it is better than an unclear response.
Relationship Nurturing. Organizations will be most successful when they focus on both
taking care of existing stakeholders and fostering relationships with new stakeholders.
Customer appreciation events are a great way to show existing stakeholders that an
organization cares. By employing these four elements in interactions with current clients,
partners, reporters and key audiences, organizations not only build a trustworthy business,
but also find management valuing strong relationships with those people who work for the
company.

These five dimensions are one common form of assessment for an organization’s adherence to
best practices in public relations practice. While this author is aware the modern public relations
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was still in its infancy or adolescence, it is of value to see how the practices adopted in this
early stage of public relations may have ultimately shaped modern practices and set the
foundation for how public relations are now practiced a century later. With the theoretical
basis for assessing public relations practices in the Four Minute Men campaign identified, the
method by which the Four Minute Men Campaign will be assessed.

Method
Method of Study
To answer the two questions posited in this study, the author performed a case analysis of
scholarship and reporting on the work of the CPI’s Four Minute Men Bureaus to document the
daily operations, decision making, and execution of the campaign process. This is particularly
valuable for determining organizational commitment to each step in the ROPES model (Kelly,
1998). In addition, the author reviewed electronic archives of the Four Minute Men Bulletins from
1917-1919. They are housed as part of the University of Colorado Boulder’s Department of
Archives World War I Pamphlets Collection and open to the public. The author used the bulletins
to ascertain what evaluation was in place for the Four Minute Men membership and how they may
have used that evaluation to adapt practices throughout the 18 months of work to shape public
opinion. While the author would have liked to also review existing copies of Four Minute Men
speeches as part of his analysis, it quickly became clear how fundamentally committed to
extemporaneous speech the organization was, as only a few sample speeches appear to have
survived.
Method of Analysis
The researcher employed a hybridization of Berkowitz’s (1997b) approach to qualitative data
analysis, facilitated with NVivo 9 qualitative analysis software. Using Nvivo, the researcher loaded
the pool of data into the software and performed the coding process using Berkowitz’s (1997b)
approach: each piece data file was read twice carefully, audio recordings were played while
reading through each of the transcripts, and a broad initial coding of emergent themes was
performed. NVivo expedites the process by permitting consolidation of large bodies of diverse
text-rich research data into one central location where the researcher can more efficiently classify,
sort and arrange information; examine relationships within the data; and combine analysis with
linking, shaping, searching, and modeling (Nvivo 9, 2011).
Result
In this review of the documented practices of the Four Minute Men, the results present a mix of
practices that reflect an early interpretation of public relations work. The following will provide
analysis of each step in the ROPES model of public relations practices (Kelly, 1998) to facilitate
a clear breakdown of practice.
Research Stage: Kelly (1998) advocates the use of research to better understand the organization,
to identify publics, opportunities, and stakeholders associated with the organization and the
opportunities associated with the campaign. What is clear about the approach of the CPI and its
Four Minute Men is an absence of primary research prior to action. Decisions were largely based
on inferential logic and the collective wisdom of journalists, advertisers, public relations
practitioners, politicians, and social scientists (Axelrod, 2009). That said, the team working to
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develop the plan for the Four Minute Man campaign made sound decisions on audience
based on what they knew about the American public. This is not inconsistent with many
modern practitioners who have to engage in strategy and tactics with minimal research due
to a lack of resources (Kelly, 1998). In short, there is limited evidence of advanced research in
practice, which doesn’t reflect the modern definition of best practices in public relations.
Objectives Stage: As is the case in examining research, there is limited data suggesting a clear set
of goals and objectives that reflect best practices in public relations. While there is a broad goal or
objective behind the Four Minute Men campaign, there is no clear articulation of a particular goal,
followed by the use of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, timely, and sufficient (SMARTS)
objectives (Ledingham, 2006). This poses problems later when we get to the evaluation step in the
process. While there is clearly a logic to the strategic approach, and the desired end is clear, the
approach of the Four Minute Men and the CPI is one that remained largely inferential.
Programming Stage: A consistent theme in the foundation of the CPI is the cooptation of good
ideas that can be of potential service to the war effort. It is apparent in how George Creel gets
support from Wilson to establish his committee, how Creel adds new areas of focus to his
propaganda effort, and in how Creel embraces the Four Minute Men campaign as part of the CPI’s
function (Axelron, 2009; Creel, 1920). While a reflection of the desperation to shape public
opinion, it is clearly not a decision couched in research. It is clearly not a plan devised of a body
of research devoted to the war effort. In this regard, WWI practices are not in keeping with the
modern definition of programming in public relations (Kelly, 1998).
This step does, however, help modern practitioners see a targeted approach to connecting with
necessary audiences, to tailor messages to those audiences, to utilize community leaders and
celebrities to deliver the message, and to see a more effective impact than other approaches.
Inasmuch as the decision-making and actions of the Four Minute Men lack the research to drive
the decision, the antecedent provided an effective example that set the tone for modern best
practices in programming, with the benefit of time and additional scholarship. In fact, the approach
of the Four Minute Men was a clear example of opinion leader theory and the two-step flow of
communication (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) at work in influencing opinion and behavior.
Evaluation Stage: Kelly (1998) identifies multiple means of evaluation in public relations work.
Summative evaluation offers an examination of the effectiveness of the campaign after the work
is complete. In reviewing the work of the Four Minute Men campaign, it is clear that nothing
summative was planned or conducted to allow for a review of outcomes. The possible exceptions
to this are Creel’s (1920) reflections on the work of the CPI and the Four Minute Men campaign,
and the direct report of the Committee on Public Information (1920). It is clear in reflection that
Bernays (1923; 1928) offered his own anecdotal evidence of the successes of the CPI, as well.
Kelly (1998) is also clear that effective evaluation should be aligned with a clear set of measurable
objectives. As noted previously, the work of the Four Minute Men campaign lacked objectives that
met this standard, so it falls short of best practices in modern public relations.
An interesting element of the Four Minute Men campaign that points to a clear precursor to
incremental evaluation (Watson & Noble, 2007) are the Four Minute Men Bulletins published and
distributed throughout the life of the campaign. The updates on achievements provided early
justification of effectiveness of the campaign process. The bulletins also offered examples of

1B3–11

PAPER 1B3 – CHRISTOPHER J. MCCOLLOUGH

rhetorical approaches from members that both succeeded and failed. In the process of
offering these examples, the bulletins also offered advice on how to adapt messages and
approaches to leverage those successes and avoid the failures. In this way, as in incremental
evaluation, the Four Minute Man worked to help practitioners improve and adapt messages to each
public effectively over the life of the campaign. In addition, the bulletins provided notice of
emerging concerns, akin to boundary scanning (Fearn-Banks, 2016).
Stewardship: In this final regard, it is clear that stewardship is not the focus of the campaign. This
is understandable given public relation’s relative infancy. The work of the CPI reflected a topdown, one-way approach to communication that emphasized pushing out messages and
information in an effort to influence the public without regard to the interests of audience. In many
respects, this is largely due to the fact that modern public relations did not think in terms of
relationships until the work of Ferguson (1984), Grunig & Hunt (1984), and Ledingham &
Bruning, 1998), which emphasizes enduring, mutually beneficial relationships in public relations
work. Interestingly, given the volume of Four Minute Men campaign messages around Liberty
Loan drives, rationing, donor drives, and other philanthropic efforts, the campaign could have
benefitted from Kelly’s (2001) emphasis on effective development strategies and its added
dimensions of stewardship.

Discussion
Literature already tells us that the CPI was an engine for modernization of practices and a better
understanding of the potential influence of journalism, advertising, and public relations on the
individual mindset and actions of citizens (Axelrod, 2009; Mastrangelo, 2009). While the present
paper draws connections to practices adopted by the CPI and Four Minute Men that helped set the
foundation for modern public relations practices, it is clear that the evolution of best practices is
the result of study of adopted practices during public relations infancy and adolescence.
Additionally, reflecting on modern campaigns has ensured the continued progression of modern
professionalism.
The need for this approach to study the discipline and refine practice becomes clear when one
considers the darkest consequences of the writings of one CPI member: Edward Bernays. In
Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) and Propaganda (1928), Bernays offered a callous picture of
the public and the ability of mass communication and persuasion to manipulate public opinion to
meet a government’s needs. These texts proved to be the stars of Joseph Goebbels personal library,
and he leveraged the lessons learned to instigate a shift in public opinion that gave rise to fascism
in Germany, dehumanization of ethnic groups and minorities, and the impetus for the Holocaust
(Bernays, 1965).
Deep reflection on this led Bernays to work to professionalize the discipline and push for greater
rigor in education and practice. His efforts in the discipline and in the classroom also helped give
rise to the Public Relations Society of America and the Public Relations Student Society of
America. His commitment to professionalization set in motion the fields of study in best practices,
ethics, and philosophy that strive to make perceptions of the field more positive.
While the Four Minute Men campaign offers an example of a clear public relations antecedent,
like most antecedents, it offers glimpses of best practices to be institutionalized, but not the whole
picture (Cutlip, 2013). This could only come from the continual self-reflection on practice that
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enables modern practitioners to better themselves and the practice as individuals and as part
of the larger discipline. Without this self-reflection, the practice of public relations runs the
risk of future grave consequences. As such, it is worth looking back at these examples and
at current work to assess not only effectiveness of practice, but the integrity of each action.
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